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Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Daryl Press. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp.161. $32.50 (hardback).
As American troops flowed into the Persian Gulf during the winter of 2002 and spring
of 2003, periodic signs of a potential diplomatic solution caused much fear and loath-
ing in the neoconservative pundit community. Saddam’s permission to allow arms
inspectors to re-enter Iraq in the fall of 2002 was met by desperate, shrill howls of
protest from neoconservative commentators like Charles Krauthammer and Eliot
Cohen, who argued that the United States couldn’t very well build up its forces in
the Gulf and then somehow allow Saddam to wriggle free once again. Such an
outcome, it was argued, would damage American credibility and demonstrate weak-
ness – when strength and seriousness of purpose were most needed.
Despite the plethora of books analysing the Bush administration’s decision to
invade Iraq, comparatively little of this analysis frames the role that ‘credibility’ had
in building the assumptive framework that led the Bush administration down the
path towards the Iraq invasion. This is surprising, since the architects of the Iraq inva-
sion unanimously decried the supposed decline of American power and prestige under
the Clinton administration, which, according to these analysts, had only emboldened
transnational terrorists and rogue regimes like Saddam Hussein. Reasserting American
power and influence using force if necessary to rein in actors like Saddam would, it was
argued, restore America’s standing in the world and serve notice to friends and foes
alike of American intent to reassert its mantle of global hegemony.
In his book Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Daryl
Press, associate professor of political science at Dartmouth, takes on the concept of
‘credibility’ as a decision-making factor drawn upon by policy-makers in military
confrontations. In this welcome addition to the literature, Press effectively strips
away the intellectual and theoretical veneer surrounding this concept by determining
the role that actor credibility played in guiding the bargaining process and policy
responses during several notable 20th-century military crises. In so doing, Press pro-
vides an important added dimension to realist and neo-realist international relations
theory, which argues that states are guided primarily by rational analysis and
balance of power considerations.
Through extensive research from declassified archives and other primary sources,
Press dissects three case studies to determine the role that credibility played in dis-
cerning actor intent: the ‘appeasement’ crises of Munich prior to World War II,
US-Soviet interactions during the 1958–61 Berlin crises, and the 1961 Cuban
missile crisis. Press looks at each of these crises in the context of the ‘past actions
theory’ of actor credibility, which holds that that past patterns of actor behaviour
provide an indication of how the adversary is likely to react during a military crisis
and, as a result, serves as a guide to policy actions by other actors in the bargaining
framework. According to this theory, for example, Hitler would have been embol-
dened by the West’s allowing him to occupy the Sudetenland and to carve up Czecho-
slovakia. Moreover, the theory suggests that the United States and Britain would not
have treated Khruschev’s repeated threats to Berlin seriously as a result of the series


































Press’s meticulously sourced analysis, however, shows that the calculations of
Hitler and that of the Allies in Berlin were almost totally based on clear-headed cal-
culations about the balance of power and that perceptions of actor credibility based on
past actions played little or no role in crafting their responses during the respective
crises. In other words, the evidence indicates that Hitler’s decision to invade
Poland was shaped not by the demonstrations of allied weakness at Munich but by
his calculations of the balance of power that gradually grew to favour Germany
during the late 1930s. Hitler overcame the opposition of a sceptical German
general staff not with arguments about weakened allied credibility, but with clear-
headed geopolitical and balance of power arguments. Likewise, the approach of
American and British officials to the Berlin crises were shaped not by Khruschev’s
repeated missed deadlines, but by their analysis of the conventional and nuclear
balance of power between the adversaries in which they recognised that escalation
to a nuclear exchange was all but inevitable once hostilities started.
Press convincingly argues that the case studies support his ‘current calculus
theory’, which suggests that actors are guided more by balance of power consider-
ations that meld assessments of both military capabilities and actor intent. The
Cuban missile crisis, according to Press, illustrates the utility of his current calculus
theory in which US actions were shaped primarily by the realisation of nuclear parity
with the Soviet Union and by Kennedy’s desire to avoid escalation to a war he was
convinced that nobody could win and which would result in the deaths of millions.
So what is the relevance of the book to foreign policy in the 21st century? Press
argues that states should not use force as a tool to signal intent to protect vital interests
elsewhere: ‘Fighting unnecessary wars reveals one’s weakness and reduces one’s
power for dealing with future crises over more important stakes (p.159)’. Consistent
with this analysis, for example, the US now approaches the Iran nuclear crisis in a
weakened state as a result of the unnecessary Iraq war.
In addition to the interesting case studies, the book is well written and approach-
able by military historians, political scientists and students interested in framing the
issue of actor credibility in an easily-understood, commonsensical light. This
reviewer highly recommends it for the bookshelves of all academics, students and
policy professionals with an interest in these issues.
# James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
War and Human Nature, Steven Peter Rosen. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2005, pp.211. $32.95/£21.50 (hardback).
Steven Rosen’s War and Human Nature is simultaneously a trailblazing and frus-
trating book, one that opens exciting new perspectives on international relations
while, at times, leaving us uncertain as to where, or how far, these paths actually
lead.
The study of international relations in general, and war in particular, usually pro-
ceeds from either of two levels of analysis: the system of interacting states or the
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